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1. Summary and Conclusions
This  paper  presents an alternative perspective on the
relationship between saving and growth; saving and
inflation stabilization;  saving and structural reform; and
saving and capital inflows; drawing on the experience of
East Asia and Latin America in the last twenty five
years.1
The paper’s perspectives on saving are based on the
following evidence:
i) higher growth precedes higher saving, rather than the
reverse. It is only after a sustained period of high growth
that saving rates increase and may do so with a delay that
can be quite significant.
ii) the most powerful determinant of saving over the long
run is economic growth.  According to this view, Latin
America's chronically low rate of saving is primarily the
consequence, more than the cause, of the region's history
of low and volatile economic growth, while the high
saving observed in the Asian "miracle" economies is due
to their high and less volatile rate of economic growth.
iii)  stabilization and reform policies aimed at raising
efficiency and promoting growth may, although
temporarily, reduce saving rates for many years and
therefore, increase the reliance of the economy on
potentially volatile capital flows.
iv)  when properly measured, capital inflows are
associated with declines in saving which are similar in
East Asia and Latin America.
                                                       
1 In this paper the term East Asia will refer to the six rapidly
growing economies Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand.
Based on this evidence the policy conclusions of this
paper differ with the prevailing views since they de-
emphasize saving as an intermediate policy target. They
are the following:
i) the emphasis of policy should be shifted away from
saving and concentrate on removing the impediments to
growth. This shift of emphasis is non-trivial, since many
efficiency raising, growth-promoting policies may result
in a temporary, but prolonged decline, in saving rates.
ii) The emphasis of policy should shift away from
avoiding the inevitable outcome of inflation stabilization
and many reform policies, i.e., a transitory decline in
saving, current account deficit and reliance on foreign
saving; and aim at reducing the vulnerability of the
economy to external shocks during this transition.
iii) whatever the merits of polices designed to stimulate a
larger participation of FDI,  they are unlikely to result in
a significant change in the way saving in Latin America
responds to capital flows.
This paper reviews the policy debate surrounding saving
in Latin America. However, we want to make clear from
the outset that we do not attempt a balanced presentation
of this issue but rather to contribute to a balanced debate
on the issue by offering an alternative perspective on
saving which is at least as consistent with the evidence as
the dominant view. The discussion is organized as
follows.  In  Section 2  we briefly outline the recent
behavior of saving in Latin America and the East Asian
“miracle” economies since the current views about the
role of saving have to a large degree been shaped by
comparison of Latin America with these more rapidly-
growing, high-saving economies. In Section 3 we review
the dominant views about the relationship between
saving, growth, and macroeconomic stability and the
policy implications that have been drawn from this views
which, to a significant degree, have already been
implemented in many countries of the region. In Section3
4 we re-examine the connection between saving and
growth.  Section 5 explores the relationship between
saving, stabilization and structural reform. Finally,
Section 6 re-examines the relationship between saving
and capital flows.
2. Saving in Asia and Latin America
Latin America’s saving rates are low, especially in
comparison with the East Asian "miracle" economies. As
Figure 1 illustrates, national saving in Latin America has
during the past decade averaged less than 20 percent of
GDP, in comparison with over 30 percent in six rapidly-
growing East Asian economies.2  Every single economy
of Latin America had a saving rate substantially below
that recorded in the Asian "miracle" economies, and in
several economies of Latin America saving rates  were
only about one-third the Asian "miracle" average.
Figure 1
National Saving in East Asia and Latin America
Percent of GDP, 1984-1993






























Recently,  concerns with saving in Latin America have
intensified because in many countries of Latin America
                                                       
2In recent years Chile's saving rate has increased
dramatically, and at around 25 percent, now approaches East
Asian levels.
already low rates of saving have in the past several years
declined, in some cases quite significantly.
Figure 2
National Saving in Latin America
1988-89 vs. 1993-94
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As Figure  2  illustrates, during the 1990s the rate of
national saving fell in 13 countries of the region, in some
cases quite dramatically. The decline in private saving
has been even more generalized, falling in all countries
but three. Thus, if low rates of saving are a cause for
concern the recent past strengthened this concern
considerably.
3.  Why Are Low Saving Rates a Problem?
The dominant view about saving highlights at least two
reasons why saving is an important macroeconomic
policy issue and can be summarized as follows: Latin
America's low rate of saving condemns the region to an
uncomfortable choice between low investment and
growth, or excessive reliance upon volatile foreign capital
which makes the region vulnerable to crises. We now
proceed to develop this argument further.
From a long-run perspective, national saving matters
for growth.
As figure 3 illustrates, high rates of saving are highly
correlated with high rates of growth. The link between4
saving and growth is not however a direct  one, but
operates through the effects of investment on growth.
Figure 3





































































































To illustrate this point, Figure 4 shows that there is also a
strong link between saving and investment, which
suggests that countries that manage to increase their
saving rate, and therefore investment, will increase their
rate of growth.
Figure 4
Saving and Investment, Latin America and E. Asia










































































There is in principle no reason to expect a very close link
between saving and domestic investment because
domestic investment can be financed by foreign saving,
through inflows of international capital. One
interpretation of this long-run relationship between
national saving and domestic investment is that over the
long run international capital flows are limited, and thus
that a sustained rise in the rate of domestic investment
requires a sustained rise in the rate of national saving.
The correlation between saving and investment is of
course not perfect, therefore there is some scope for
boosting domestic investment above domestic saving by
encouraging international capital flows, even over a
relatively long time horizon.  But the correlation between
domestic saving and investment is high, suggesting that
this scope is limited.
From a short-run perspective, low rates of saving
increase vulnerability.
According to the dominant view, low rates of saving are
also associated with increased vulnerability to
macroeconomic crisis (see for example, Bruno, 1996,
Razin, 1996 and Summers, 1996a, 1996b). A country
with a low or declining rate of saving, may occasionally
be forced to run large current account deficits to maintain
reasonable levels of investment. Excessive reliance on
foreign saving unduly exposes the economy to volatile
international capital flows. A sudden decline in the
inflows of capital might force on the recipient economy a
very abrupt and, therefore, disruptive macroeconomic
adjustment.
For the tenets of the dominant view, the crisis in Mexico
has become associated with that country's low and
declining rate of saving and the very large current
account deficits during the years leading up to the crisis.
In this context, the almost complete insulation of high-
saving economies such as Chile and the East Asian
"miracle" economies from the financial turbulence that
gripped many "emerging-market" economies in the
immediate aftermath of the Mexican devaluation, is
contrasted with the financial turbulence that affected5
countries with a less impressive saving performance such
as Argentina.3 International comparisons, and
particularly comparisons of Latin America with East
Asia, thus provide some support for the idea that saving
is an important force for economic stability, as well as
growth.
Corresponding to the dominant view on the relationship
between saving, growth and stability there is a policy
agenda to address the problem of low saving rates in
Latin America. This policy agenda focuses on
mechanisms to tackle the problem of low saving directly
as follows:
i) Increase national saving by raising public saving.
ii) Promote private saving by creating a stable and
predictable economic environment that rewards savers for
thrift and reduces fears that inflation or a collapsing
financial system will lead to expropriation of their saving.
This implies stabilizing inflation, strengthening domestic
financial institutions, and increasing the role of market
signals in the allocation of saving and investment, i.e.; the
elimination of “financial repression”.
iii) Promote contractual saving, in particular through the
establishment of fully-funded social security systems.
Much of this agenda is perfectly sensible. In fact, each of
these reforms have already been implemented by many
countries in the region or, where they have not, they are
at the top of the policy agenda. However, although these
policies are highly desirable for their potential impact on
economic efficiency and growth, they are unlikely to have
large, immediate effects on saving in the short to medium
term. Furthermore, as we shall see in Section 5, there is
good reason to believe that some of these reforms will
                                                       
3 It should be noted that many countries with an also poor
saving performance, such as Colombia, were also largely
immune to the "tequila effect".
have a temporary negative impact on saving in the short
term.
4. Saving and Economic Growth
Econometric studies of the determinants of saving rates
(see for example, Edwards, 1994 and CEPAL, 1995)
suggest that the long-run behavior of saving is closely
related to an economy’s rate of growth and income per
capita levels. However, close association does not
establish causation and this is a crucial element in the
design of policy. As  Deaton (1995) points out “the
causation is important, not just for understanding the
process, but for the design of policy. If saving is merely
the passive adjunct to growth or to investment, then
policies for growth should presumably be directed at
investment (in people, plant or equipment) or at the
efficiency of such investment, with saving allowed to look
after itself. But if saving is the prime mover, the focus
should be on saving incentives, such as tax breaks (...),
compulsory saving in (fully-funded) employee provident
funds, as in Malaysia, Singapore and Chile, to the design
of social security systems, or to the role of financial
intermediation in general, improvements in which are
variously argued both to increase and decrease saving”.
Although the issue is far from settled, the view that
growth appears to precede saving rather than the reverse
has recently found support in several recent papers,
including an influential contribution by Carroll and Weil
(1994).  That paper examined the relationship between
saving and economic growth in a  sample covering a large
number of countries over several decades, and found that
past growth predicts future saving rates, while past
saving rates do not predict future growth.4
                                                       
4Technically, the paper asked whether saving "Granger
causes" growth and vice versa.  One variable "Granger
causes" another if observations of the first variable help
predict subsequent movements in the second, after taking into
account the predictive value of the second variable's own6
The fact that increased growth tends to precede increased
saving rates suggests that saving may be, to an important
extent, caused by, in addition to causing, economic
growth.5
The pattern of strong increases in saving rates after an
acceleration of growth is illustrated by the experience of
the Asian “miracle”economies. Figure 5 shows the
(population-weighted) average saving rates for Latin
America and the Asian "miracle" economies. Saving rates
increased substantially in the Asian “miracle” economies
while they remained stagnant in Latin America since the
early 1970's. The Asian economies have during recent
years had a much higher rate of saving than Latin
America. But this is a relatively recent phenomenon,
resulting from a long and gradual increase in Asian
saving from rates that were, in the 1970s, generally below
those recorded in Latin America.  Only in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, after the acceleration of growth in Asia,
did Asian saving rates rise consistently and substantially
above Latin American rates.6
                                                                                                
history.  The paper found that growth "Granger causes"
saving, while saving appears not to "Granger cause" growth.
5A plausible mechanism through which growth may "cause"
saving operates through the need to provide self-finance for at
least a portion of the many profitable investments available in
a high-growth economy, in an environment of imperfect
capital markets.  Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (1995) argue
for the importance of this mechanism in the context of low-
income economies, and Liu and Woo (1994) provide evidence
on its empirical importance for Taiwan.
6  Granger causality test performed for the Asian “miracle”
economies are consistent with the results obtained by Carroll
and  Weil (1994). In all cases growth was high early and
saving high later.
Figure 5
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In Latin America, Chile is another example where strong
increases in saving  followed the acceleration of growth.7
Figure 6 shows that Chile's economic recovery began in
1984, when domestic saving was still quite depressed,
and the economy was as a result heavily reliant upon
capital inflows to finance domestic investment.8  It was
only in the late 1980s, after several years of sustained
economic growth, that Chilean saving rates approached
the high levels now observed.
                                                       
7 For a comprehensive and formal treatment of saving
behavior in Chile, see Agosín, Crespi and Letelier (1996) and
Morandé (1996).
8This reliance can be seen in the large current-account
deficits in the early stages of the economic recovery.7
Figure 6
Growth, saving and the current account in Chile
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The estimated impact of growth on saving is not only
statistically significant, but also very large in economic
terms.  In fact, the differences between East Asian and
Latin American growth rates is sufficient to explain the
differences in the regions' long-run saving behavior
depicted in Figure 5. Using an econometric model of the
determinants of saving rates, which is described in the
appendix of this paper, Figure 7 illustrates the impact of
growth on saving by providing an estimate of what Asian
saving rates would have been if those countries had had
Latin America's rate of economic growth during the past
twenty five years.
Figure 7
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The figure shows that if, during 1970-1994, the East
Asian "miracles" had experienced the economic growth
recorded by Latin America, the Asian saving rate would,
other things equal, have been even  lower than that
recorded in Latin America.  This implies that essentially
all of the difference between saving rates in Latin
America and the Asian "miracle" economies is explained
by differences in their growth performance.
This does not mean that other determinants of saving are
unimportant but that they are unlikely to account for
much of the long-run difference in Latin American and
East Asian rates of saving, or for the recent, sustained
increase in Chilean saving rates.  For example, the
econometric model of this paper and other work by other
authors find that although improvements in the terms of
trade typically increase saving, the effect appears to be
purely transitory, as economic theory would predict, and
therefore unlikely to explain the differences in long-run
behavior.9  Other determinants of saving, such as the
distribution of income, the age distribution of the
population and demography may also be statistically
relevant.10 But none of these factors can account
quantitatively, for the dramatic shift from relatively low
to very high saving rates that  occurred  in the Asian
"miracle" economies since the early 1970's, and in Chile
since the mid-1980s.
Policy Issues
The main policy implication of the view that growth is the
prime mover and not saving, is that policy efforts should
                                                       
9Held and Uthoff (1995) actually find a negative effect of the
terms of trade on saving.
10For example, Edwards (1994) finds some evidence that the
age dependency ratio (the fraction of the population either
younger than 15 or older than 65 years of age) is negatively
related to domestic saving rates.  In some specifications of his
model a more equal distribution of income is associated with
a higher saving rate, but this result was not robust.8
concentrate in removing the impediments to growth rather
than trying to establish programs aimed directly at
promoting saving that are likely to be of dubious
effectiveness and may involve economic inefficiencies.
Of course, policy impediments to saving should be
removed, but policy should be mainly concerned with
establishing an environment conducive to high and
sustained rates of growth, trusting saving to follow in
response to the incentives that such an environment
provides.
Although policies aimed at increasing saving may exhibit
a substantial overlap with those aimed at removing
impediments to growth, the shift of emphasis in the policy
objective from saving to growth is non-trivial. As we will
argue in the following section, many efficiency-raising,
growth promoting policies are likely to have an adverse
effect on saving, that although temporary, may last for
many years.
5. Saving, Stabilization and Structural Reform
In line with the policy agenda suggested by the prevailing
views on saving,  Latin America’s economic reforms of
the past decade have included: fiscal consolidation;
inflation stabilization; financial liberalization and reform,
and in some countries, the creation of mechanisms for
contractual saving via the replacement of pay-as-you-go
with fully-funded social security systems.11 Trade
liberalization has also been pervasive, and although not
usually mentioned in the context of policy towards saving
it may nonetheless have a substantial impact on the
saving rate.
                                                       
11Social security reform has been undertaken in Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay and are underway in
Brazil and Mexico.
We now proceed to review each of these policies and to
assess their impact on saving behavior.
Fiscal Consolidation
A cornerstone of the region's economic reform efforts has
been fiscal consolidation, which has brought budget
deficits from nearly 10 percent of GDP in the early 1980s
to about 3 percent in recent years.  But while public
saving increased significantly in most of Latin America,
private saving declined in several countries, leading to a
reduction in total saving, as is illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8
Public and private saving in Latin America
(Percent of GDP)
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Both theory and evidence suggest that increased public
saving is likely to generate a reduction in private9
saving.12  This means that, in order to  raise domestic
saving by one dollar, governments may need to increase
public saving by 2 or more dollars.  Doing so is not
costless: raising taxes imposes important costs on the
economy and may reduce economic growth, and reducing
spending may make it impossible to carry out worthwhile
public programs.
This does not mean that governments in the region should
not strengthen their fiscal position.  It does mean that, if
done efficiently, it is unlikely to yield large increases in
aggregate saving. Moreover, it is easier and more
efficient to improve public saving in a growing economy
with stable and moderate tax rates.
As we will discuss below, further deepening of the
region's recent fiscal consolidation, grounded in
meaningful reforms of the region's budgetary institutions,
remains one of the Latin America's priorities.  But this is
likely to be an expensive means of raising total saving.
Inflation Stabilization
The second element of the policy prescription emphasizes
the importance not only of raising domestic saving, but
also ensuring that it will remain in the domestic economy
to finance domestic investment.  After all, high saving
will provide little support for economic development if
the saving leaves the economy in the form of capital
flight. An important reason for such capital flight is fear
                                                       
12See Edwards (1994) for evidence that private saving in
Latin America tends to decline by about 50 cents for every
dollar by which public saving increases.  Economic theory
provides an explanation for this, though not everyone
considers the theory entirely plausible: a budget surplus in the
current period implies lower debt service, and therefore lower
taxes, in future periods.  Looking forward, consumers realize
that, because of the lower future taxes, they can afford to
consume more, thus saving less, in the current period.  The
increase in public saving is therefore offset by a decrease in
private saving.  Some theories suggest that the offset should
be complete, but most empirical estimates of the offset
suggest that it is about 50 percent.
that wealth will be confiscated in a bout of unexpectedly
high inflation.  Thus a second item on the policy agenda
for saving is inflation stabilization.
In this front too substantial progress has been made in
Latin America (see Figure 9).  With the recent Brazilian
stabilization, extreme inflation has essentially vanished
from the continent.  While in 1990 10 of the region's 26
countries experienced inflation rates greater than 40
percent, only 4 countries did so in 1994 and 1995.
Figure 9


























































































Inflation stabilization is a particularly relevant example
to illustrate how efficiency raising, growth promoting
policies  may  reduce saving in the short to medium run,
since it is a well established empirical regularity that
exchange rate-based stabilizations are expansionary and
generate in the initial stages a consumption boom and a
corresponding decline in saving (see for example, Kiguel
and Liviatan, 1992 and Végh, 1992). It is only later that
consumption contracts and the economy falls into
recession. An important reason for the decline in Latin
American rates of saving during the 1990s is the major
inflation stabilization programs that have been pursued in
many countries (see IDB, 1996b).
To illustrate the potential economic significance of the
relationship between inflation stabilization and saving we10
used the model described in the appendix to simulate the
impact of a major inflation stabilization, that reduces the
rate of inflation from 1000 percent per year to zero,  and
increases in the  long-run rate of economic growth by 2%
per year.  The results are illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10
Simulated impact on saving of a major inflation



























































































The econometric model predicts a  2 percentage point
decline in the rate of saving in the immediate aftermath of
the stabilization.  The effect is transitory, and eventually
the higher economic growth leads to a higher rate of
saving.  But while transitory, the model predicts that it
will take five years for saving to recover its pre-
stabilization levels.
Even in the long-run, the impact of inflation stabilization
on saving is ambiguous. The statistical work prepared for
this paper (as described in the appendix) as well as other
studies, including Held and Uthoff (1995) and Morandé
(1996) indicate that lower inflation, when controlling for
other determinants of saving rates, is associated with
lower rates of saving.13  The available evidence thus
                                                       
13 Edwards (1994) finds no significant impact of inflation on
national saving.  The results in Held and Uthoff (1995) break
down if the sample of countries is restricted.
suggests that inflation stabilization, whatever its other
good effects, has almost certainly the short-run effect of
reducing, rather than increasing saving, and an
ambiguous impact in the long-run.
Financial-System Reform
The policy agenda emphasizes the need not only to
provide a stable currency, but also to build a financial
system in which domestic savers can be rewarded for
thrift and have confidence in its soundness.
Here, too, many countries in the region have made
substantial progress; domestic financial institutions have
been privatized, and markets have been largely freed from
quantitative credit restrictions and interest-rate ceilings.
While there remains much to be done, one key objective,
at least, was largely fulfilled: confidence in the domestic
financial system has increased and this increase in
confidence was reflected in a large increase in the size of
domestic financial systems in many countries, as
domestic and foreign savers both became more willing to
place their savings there.  As had been the objective, this
provided domestic banks with funds to invest
domestically.
However, while a deeper financial system may have
positive effects on saving in the long run, the resultant
increase in the size of the domestic financial system has
had little effect on saving in Latin America in the short
run.  As Figure 11 illustrates, short-run changes in
financial depth, as measured by the size of the domestic
banking system bears little relationship to changes in
national saving in the region. Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia,
for example, recently experienced large increases in
financial depth but saving rates were largely unaffected in
Bolivia and declined in Mexico and Brazil.11
Figure 11
Financial depth and national saving Latin America
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Mexico presents an extreme, but nonetheless revealing
example of the short-run consequences of rapid growth in
domestic financial intermediation.14  That country saw a
large increase in the demand for domestic bank deposits
during 1990-1994, driven in large part by the country's
success in stabilizing inflation.  At the same time the
government was using privatization revenue to repay its
loans from the banking system.  The result was a large
increase in resources available for commercial banks to
lend.
                                                       
14See Gavin and Hausmann (1995) for discussion of other
countries in the region.
Figure 12
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As Figure 12 illustrates, Mexican bank lending to the
private sector rose from less than 10 percent of GDP in
1989 to nearly 40 percent in 1994.   This lending
financed some investment, which recovered substantially
during 1990-1994, but much of the lending also went to
consumers.  The greater availability of credit relaxed
constraints on consumption spending, and was almost
certainly a major factor underlying the substantial decline
in Mexican saving during the years leading up to the
1995 crisis.  Thus, a policy of financial liberalization that
was justified, in part, by a desire to raise saving appears
to have had, at least in the short run, exactly the opposite
result.
Contractual Saving
Another element of the policy response to the problem of
low saving in Latin America is the implementation of
contractual saving schemes, particularly  fully-funded
social security systems.
Fully funded social security systems have several
advantages. First, they ameliorate the governance
problem inherent in pay-as-you-go systems due to the fact
that future taxpayers are not represented in political
decision making about levels of social-security benefits12
that they will be required to provide. Second,  there is
also evidence from the Chilean experience that fully-
funded social security systems can provide an important
impetus to development of domestic capital markets.
However, the effects on saving are not likely to be large
unless the reform is accompanied by fiscal tightening.
The largest and most direct impact of social security
reform on saving is that generated by cleaning up the
fiscal disarray typically created by pay-as-you-go social
security systems. The reform requires that today's
workers save for their own retirement.  The question is
who pays for today’s pensioners?   Saving increases to
the extent that current taxpayers do.  But if the
government accommodates this obligation through an
increase in the deficit, there is no direct effect on national
saving.
In Chile the reform implied a major fiscal adjustment to
pay for the current pensioners and the direct effect on
public saving was therefore significant, roughly 3 percent
of GDP, though small in comparison with the increase in
total saving registered over the past decade, roughly 15
percent of GDP.15  But reforms in other Latin American
countries have not involved a similar fiscal adjustment,
and the impact of reform on saving is therefore likely to
be much smaller  (Ayala , 1995).
One of the most important effects of pension reform is its
contribution to financial-market development. This
appears to have also been the case in Chile. Such
development  is likely to promote a more efficient
allocation of both domestic and foreign saving flows to
the economy, since there is evidence that deep financial
markets act as "shock absorbers".
Trade Liberalization
Trade liberalization is not usually associated with the
issue of saving. However, trade liberalization can lead to
                                                       
15 See, for example, Agosín, Crespi and Letelier (1996).
a transitory decline in saving and an increase in
investment.  Such liberalization generally reduces the cost
of imported consumer durable goods and capital goods,
leading to a temporary burst of spending on such goods,
as consumers and firms adjust upward their stock.
During this transitory period of stock adjustment,
conventional measures of saving decline.16
As Calvo (1988) has suggested, trade liberalization can
also lead to a reduction in saving if it is perceived as
transitory. If liberalization is perceived to be temporary,
consumers may have an even stronger incentive to
purchase imported consumption goods during the time
when they are temporarily inexpensive, thus leading to a
transitory consumption boom and decline in the rate of
saving.
Figure 13 illustrates the behavior of saving and
investment before and after trade liberalization for fifteen
Latin American countries and lends support to the idea
that, on impact, trade liberalization reduces saving and
deteriorates the current account balance.
                                                       
16Although most countries' accounts consider it so, it is
debatable  whether  an increase in spending in consumer
durables really represents a decline in saving at all, because
the purchases of consumer  durables are really a form of
investment in an asset that will yield benefits, potentially for
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Policy Issues
Stabilization and reform policies which are intended to
raise efficiency and promote growth trigger a complex
dynamics.  In many cases, these reforms will generate a
transitory decline in saving, particularly if there is a
substantial lag between the implementation of the reforms
and the arrival of the higher output. Higher output (and
income) should eventually, according to our model, lead
to higher saving.
The fact that highly desirable economic reforms may have
a transitory adverse impact on saving has important
implications.  First, it highlights the importance of
properly diagnosing a decline in saving, which may result
not from inadequate policies but instead the reverse.
Second,  it is important to ensure that growth-friendly
policies will not be foregone or delayed because of the
possibility of a transitory, adverse impact on saving.
Since there may be a reasonably long delay between the
recovery of growth and the saving response, the economy
is likely to be reliant upon capital inflows, until it reaches
a high-growth, high-savings equilibrium.  In this
transition, the economy may be vulnerable to external
shocks or a sudden loss of confidence.
Since shocks to the economy in this phase may derail the
reform process and thwart growth complementary
policies that make the economy more resilient need to be
implemented, so that the inevitable shocks can be
absorbed without aborting  the positive effects of reforms
on growth and saving.  Policies aimed directly at raising
saving are unlikely to be the most effective means of
reducing vulnerability.  Instead the stress points in the
economy, where shocks can trigger collapse, must be
strengthened.
We focus here on two particularly important areas that
have been weak links in many Latin American economies,
and where appropriate policies can substantially improve
a country's "shock resistance" and ability to bridge the
transition to high savings:  domestic financial systems
and fiscal policy.17
The domestic financial system:  The domestic financial
system is crucial because it will called upon to
intermediate some, though not all, of the potentially
volatile capital flows during the transition.  For example,
foreign direct investment and equity portfolio investment
are not intermediated by banks, but foreign deposits in the
domestic banking system clearly are.  This intermediation
is, of course, an essential function of banks, but it carries
with it the potential for instability and crisis because the
intermediation involves a transformation of term structure
and a transfer of risk, and because implicit or explicit
public insurance of the banking system generates strong
problems of moral hazard.
The transformation of term structure carried out by banks
means that savers obtain liquid bank deposits,  which
banks use to fund longer-term lending commitments.
This is not inherently bad, but it can exaggerate swings in
capital flows and their macroeconomic consequences,18
                                                       
17Such policies were the focus of the special chapter of the
1995 Report on Economic and Social Progress.
18Goldfajn and Valdes (1995).14
and creates the potential for financial crisis if depositors
attempt to withdraw their deposits from the system more
rapidly than banks' lending commitments can be wound
down.  Unless the financial system possesses sufficient
liquid reserves to manage such liquidity shocks, even a
brief and unwarranted panic by depositors can bring the
financial system to its knees, potentially crippling the real
economy and creating the very macroeconomic crisis that
depositors feared.  Because banks generally benefit from
implicit or explicit insurance, they have inadequate
incentives to  remain sufficiently liquid, and there might
be a role for policy to ensure that they do.
Financial  intermediation also means that the risk of
lending is shifted from savers, the value of whose
deposits is largely unaffected by the return on the bank's
loan portfolio, to shareholders of the bank and, because
of implicit public insurance schemes, to taxpayers.  This
poses a strong moral hazard problem, and in particular
creates the danger that a surge of capital inflows will
generate a lending boom, in which excessively risky and
potentially wasteful projects are funded because the costs
of particularly bad outcomes largely fall upon taxpayers
not the bank managers responsible for making the loans.
This creates the need to institute a conservative bank
supervisory system that enforces appropriate capital-
adequacy standards and, as necessary, to adjust domestic
monetary policy to forestall such credit booms.19  This
may reduce somewhat the efficiency of bank
intermediation, but failing to do so leaves the economy
open to periodic macroeconomic and financial crises of
the sort that have too often interrupted Latin American
growth and development.
Fiscal policy:  The transition to a high-growth high-
saving equilibrium will generally involve periods of
                                                       
19See the proceedings of the IDB/Group of 30 conference on
Banking Crises in Latin America, and in particular Gavin
and Hausmann (1996) and Rojas-Suarez and  Weisbrod
(1995b).
transitory spending booms. These will have favorable
fiscal implications because taxes are mainly levied on
domestic spending. The danger is that the transitory fiscal
benefits will generate permanent public spending
commitments or permanent reductions in tax rates. These
changes weaken fiscal sustainability but do not
necessarily show up in a deterioration of the observed
fiscal deficit. However, the structural fiscal situation will
be vulnerable and fiscal deficits  will appear when the
boom subsides.20
The problem of an inadequate reaction of fiscal policy is
a deep one, and may arise because of problems in
securing the collective action required to generate an
appropriate response.  Anticipating this, financial
markets may lose confidence in the sustainability of fiscal
policy, even if the country currently exhibits relatively
low deficits, as did Mexico in 1994.
Solving this problem probably requires deep reforms in
the budgetary institutions that shape fiscal policy
determination in the region.21  Here we point out that,
while future fiscal policy reforms are essential to secure
the economic stability required for sustained growth, our
perspective departs from the conventional wisdom in two
key respects.  First, the focus on ensuring macroeconomic
stability makes it clear that the issue is not merely raising
rates of public saving with the aim of increasing total
national saving.  The real need is to create institutional
structures that provide real assurance that fiscal policy
will be well managed in good times.  If the institutional
                                                       
20See Talvi (1996) for a theoretical statement of this problem,
and Talvi (1995) for an empirical discussion in the
Uruguayan context.
21This problem is being explored in an ongoing research
project in the Office of the Chief Economist.  See Alesina,
Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1995), Hausmann and Stein
(1996), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1996), and Gavin,
Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996).15
reforms are effective, they will permit larger deficits in
bad times, thus promoting a more counter-cyclical fiscal
policy, but not necessarily one with higher public saving
on average.  Second, our perspective highlights the need
to tackle problems in the formulation of fiscal policy by
addressing the underlying institutional and political
causes of  suboptimal fiscal policymaking, rather than
simply exhorting governments to behave themselves.
6. Saving and Capital Inflows22
Another context in which saving has recently arisen as a
policy issue is in the macroeconomic response to large
capital inflows.  The dominant view is that East Asia has
invested these inflows, while Latin America has mainly
consumed them. The associated decline in Latin
American saving is blamed for the region's greater
vulnerability to interruptions in the flow of international
capital.
Lawrence Summers, Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury
and Michael Bruno, Chief Economist at the World Bank
have  spoused this view:
“Policy makers must look at how capital flows
are being used. For nations as well as for
people, borrowing to finance investment is seen
as healthy, but borrowing to finance
consumption is much more problematic. When
the lion’s share of inflows is being used  for
investment, there is the presumption that the
economy is generating the capital to repay these
obligations....Similarly, the national saving rate
can offer some evidence as to whether capital
inflows are being used to finance unsustainable
consumption or investment...” (Summers,
1996a)
                                                       
22 For a formal treatment of the issues presented in this
section see Reinhart and Talvi (1996).
“In both Latin America and East Asia, private
capital inflows in recent years have amounted
to some 3 to 4 percent of GDP. But as Larry
Summers noted, whether this is a good thing or
not depends on whether those inflows went to
finance investment or consumption. On this
score, the two regions differ: capital flows to
East Asia (except the Philippines) primarily
financed private investment, whereas in Latin
America as a whole (but not in Chile), they
financed an increase in consumption...” (Bruno
1996).
Figure 14 illustrates the behavior of capital flows to East
Asia and Latin America. There is a very similar pattern
in both regions:  during the 1978-1982 period capital
flows were very large, they declined substantially during
1983-1989, and increased once again during the 1990-
1994 period.23
Figure 14
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As Figure 15 shows, in both Latin America and Asia, the
inflows were eventually reflected in larger current-
                                                       
23 This is not surprising due to the significant role of external
factors in determining the size and direction of capital flows
to developing countries (see Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart,
1993).16
account deficits, with the Asian current account moving
somewhat further into deficit than that of Latin America.
In some individual countries of Asia, notably Thailand,
current account deficits in the early 1990s exceeded the 8
percent of GDP recorded by Mexico before the crisis, and
have remained in the neighborhood of 6 percent of GDP
in recent years.
Figure 15
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However, as was pointed out by Summers and Bruno,
and illustrated in Figure 16,  the two regions differ in the
way current account deficits were allocated between
higher investment and lower saving. While current
account deficits mainly financed investment in East Asia
they financed consumption, i.e., declines in saving, in
Latin America.
Figure 16
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This perception is, somewhat misleading, in that it fails to
make a clear enough distinction between trend and short-
run movements in saving.  While it is true that the Asian
saving rate did not fall during the capital inflows episode
of 1990-1994, it had been growing rapidly since the mid-
1970s, and Asian saving rates did fall in relation to this
increasing trend.  Indeed, once the trend is subtracted
from the actual saving rate to estimate the cyclical or
short-run component, a remarkable similarity emerges
between the East Asian and the Latin American
experience.  This is illustrated  in Figure 17.
Figure 17
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This figure graphs the cyclical component of saving rates
in East Asia and Latin America, defined as the difference17
between the actual saving rate and a simple trend line.
The correlation between the short-run fluctuations in
Latin American and East Asian saving rates is very high,
and it is very hard to explain except as the response to a
common, international shock.
Even more striking is the strong similarity in the Asian
and Latin American relationship between changes in  the
current-account balance and cyclical fluctuations in
saving rates.
Figure 18 shows that saving is inversely correlated with
current account deficits in Latin America. This is of
course not surprising. Much recent commentary has
focused on this fact and how it has increased Latin
America's economic vulnerability.
Figure 18





































































































































Perhaps more surprising is the very similar relationship
between current accounts and the cyclical component of
saving in East Asia, as illustrated in Figure 19.  In
contrast with the widely held view, which asserts that
current account deficits in Asia have been associated with
increased investment rather than reduced saving,
fluctuations in the East Asian current account are, as in
Latin America,  associated with reductions in saving,
when measured relative to a long-run trend.
Figure 19





























































































































The similarity of the short-run response of saving and
investment to capital-flow shocks in Latin America and
East Asia suggests two things: first, that attention should
be directed away from short-run and toward long-run
saving (and investment) behavior, where the differences
between the regions are much larger and arguably more
significant. Second, one is led to search elsewhere for
explanations of Latin America's greater financial
vulnerability.
Policy Issues
Several explanations have been offered to account for the
different response of saving to capital inflows in Latin
America and East Asia.  One of them emphasizes the
different composition of capital flows, i.e., East Asia
receives a larger share of  total flows in the form of FDI
than Latin America, as mainly responsible for the
different response of saving in both regions (see for
example, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1994).
The policy prescription of this view says that Latin
America should find ways to change the composition of18
capital inflows to stimulate a larger participation of FDI
in total flows. This policy would ensure that a larger
share of the resources made available by capital inflows
are invested and not consumed.
Given the evidence we presented, whatever the merits of
policies designed to increase the participation of FDI in
total capital flows, they are unlikely to result in a
significant change in the way saving in Latin America
responds to those flows.19
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Appendix
This appendix presents the results obtained from the estimation, on a 26 country data set --six East Asian “miracle”
economies and 20 Latin American countries-- of the determinants of saving.  The estimation was performed on a panel of
annual data for the period 1970-1993, utilizing a new data set on saving assembled by the International Monetary Fund.
The specification of the saving model is in line with both economic theory and with the previous empirical literature on
saving (see for example Edwards, 1994 and Held and Uthoff 1995).  This specification also allows for a simple dynamic
structure, which in turn allows us to capture the dynamic adjustment of the economic system to its long-run equilibrium, in
response to temporary and permanent shocks.
The variables included in the saving model are the following: growth of GDP per capita (ggcap) and GDP per capita (gcap)
which were obtained from Summers and Heston; inflation (infl), capital flows (kflows) and changes in the terms of trade
(gtot) which were obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
The results of the regression are presented in the Table A1:
Table A1
Dependent variable - National Saving
Included observations: 416
Variable      Coefficient  Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
GCAP (-1)  2.75E-05 5.87E-06  4.685077 0.0000
GGCAP  0.102982 0.035269  2.919924 0.0037
KFLOWS -0.206742 0.050839 -4.066629 0.0001
GTOT  0.053568 0.008768  6.109410 0.0000
GTOT(-1)  0.028714 0.009629  2.982002 0.0030
GTOT(-2)  0.014147 0.008428  1.678498 0.0940
INFL -0.000687 0.000242 -2.841819 0.0047
INFL(-1)  0.002024 0.000273  7.420894 0.0000
INFL(-2)  0.000758 0.000293  2.586022 0.0101
INFL(-3) -0.000472 0.000272 -1.735052 0.0835
C  0.110729 0.028247  3.920071 0.0001
AR(1) 0.023399  38.04861 0.0000
R-squared        0.840481 Mean dependent var          0.198719
Adjusted R-squared  0.836137 S.D. dependent var                  0.090120
S.E. of regression     0.036481 Akaike info criterion              -6.593527
Sum squared resid    0.537657 Schwartz criterion         -6.477257
Log likelihood       793.1751 F-statistic          193.5099
Durbin-Watson stat  2.103030 Prob(F-statistic)          0.000000
Inverted AR Roots   .8923
The results of the regression indicate that saving is (i) positively affected by the rate of growth, i.e., faster growing
economies should, other things being equal, enjoy higher saving rates; (ii) positively affected by the level of income per
capita; and (iii) negatively related to the availability of foreign saving (capital flows).  A permanent improvement
(deterioration) in the terms of trade, temporarily increases (decreases) the saving rate but has no permanent effects.  A
permanent reduction (increase) in the rate of inflation, reduces temporarily the saving rate, which later increases (decreases)
to a level which is close, but still lower (higher), than the one prevailing before the reduction (increase) in the inflation rate.